It may be convenient to note, for a beginning, and in a quite kulturgeschichtlich way, that the best of Marxist productions have tended to develop as a critique of theories elaborated in other domains: starting as a critique of political economy, Marxism produced its first important rupture with the young Lukacs in a critique ofneo-Kantianism; reached one of its summits with Gramsci in a critique of Croce's idealism; underwent an important revision with the Frankfurt school and Marcuse in a critique of Freud; prospered shortly as the philosophy of "praxis," discreetly flirting with Heideggerianism; and entered its own "post-" period with Habermas, critically reformulating the achievements of the analytical tradition. It may weIl be that the "truth" ofthese attempts, which, symptomatically, have never been acknowledged within the fields they took as the pre-texts oftheir critiques, and have always met with strong opposition from other Marxisms, lies in theoretically marginal enterprises of the same style -in Lenin's critique of Machism, in Reich's critical recuperation of Freud, even in Fromm's revisionism. By virtue of their very naivete, the latter openly demonstrate what might remain occulted in more solid projects of the former kind, i.e. a fundamental lack of its own theoretical language that might even be the defining feature of every Marxism. Since a dogmatic petrification of Marxist concepts has been a parallel and no less characteristic trait of their history, we may sharpen this point and say that a certain refusal of a specifically Marxist conceptualization is a necessary debt that every Marxism has to pay in order to remain on a properly theoreticallevel. This refusal, when not thematized (as has mostly been the case), usually resulted in a symptomatic passage CL l'acte, an immediatist drive to join every-day politics, so that the list of the theoretical achievements of the various Marxisms mayas weIl be viewed as the list of their political failures. * This is a paradoxical balance sheet for a thought that has not only always insisted upon its theoretical character, but has also conceptualized the "theorization" of politics as its own historical invention ("scientific socialism"). There are two reasons for it, the first being the effect of the second, and both having remained an object of theoretical denegation, Verneinung, within the Marxist tradition: for although they have been, in an "objective" thetical manner, present in Marxist thought since its beginnings, Marxist theory has never fully elaborated the consequences they entail as regards its own status.
The first reason pertains to the political dimension immanent to any Marxism worthy of its name. Even before drawing eventual practical implications for the political conflicts of its time, every Marxism is immanently political; its politics is, in the first place, theoretical. This means not only that the "outer" practical dimension is always already contained within the hard theoretical core of every Marxism, but, more importantly, that only that project is "Marxist" which proceeds as a theoretical representation of the class struggle within the field of theory itself. In this sense, a Marxism has no object, for it is astrategy; and it has no "proper" conceptual apparatus, for it is only a political operation performed upon concepts already given by other theories. This first reason for the absence of a distinctive conceptual inventory pertains as weIl to the philosophical dimension of Marxism: philosophy being, according to Althusser,l the representation of class struggle within the field oftheory.
The second reason may be deduced from the first, for it is in fact its material cause: if class struggle is such a universal phenomenon that even explicitly universalistic projects ("theories") can pretend to escape it only in a self-delusive attempt at "objective neutrality," then there is no possible outer, neutral, final ground that might legitimate a wholistic * Since this essay was written (1988) , this thesis has, ironically, been tested at the expense of the theoretical context to which it belongs: although the democratic struggles in Slovenia were, atypically for "real socialism," dominated by a politically left-oriented materialist theory, the free elections subsequent to their victory, typically, brought into power a right-wing nationalist-populist coalition. The political concern that made for the theoretical strength entailed a political weakness: it made the theory share one of the most striking features of its "object" -the foreclosure of the problematics of fascism by the ideologies of "totalitarian" socialism.
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GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL remain on a properly theoreticallevel. This refusal, when not thematized (as has mostly been the case), usually resulted in a symptomatic passage CL l'acte, an immediatist drive to join every-day politics, so that the list of the theoretical achievements of the various Marxisms mayas weIl be viewed as the list of their political failures. * This is a paradoxical balance sheet for a thought that has not only always insisted upon its theoretical character, but has also conceptualized the "theorization" of politics as its own historical invention ("scientific socialism"). There are two reasons for it, the first being the effect of the second, and both having remained an object of theoretical denegation, Verneinung, within the Marxist tradition: for although they have been, in an "objective" thetical manner, present in Marxist thought since its beginnings, Marxist theory has never fully elaborated the consequences they entail as regards its own status.
The second reason may be deduced from the first, for it is in fact its material cause: if class struggle is such a universal phenomenon that even explicitly universalistic projects ("theories") can pretend to escape it only in a self-delusive attempt at "objective neutrality," then there is no possible outer, neutral, final ground that might legitimate a wholistic theoretical enterprise. There are histories, but no History, there are interpretations of society, effects of the social, there may even be an effect of Society, but there is no Society proper. For a science that takes historical society as its object, the consequence is dramatic: the loss of its object is the first effect of its materialist conceptualization, Le. the first achievement of historical materialism. The second reason for the absence of a distinctive conceptual apparatus in the various Marxisms thus pertains to their scientific dimension, and results from the self-destruction of any object of knowledge that would pretend to correspond to a hypothetical real object (society, history) whose very existence is negated by the materialist scientific procedure itself.
The summing up of the prima vista negative unity of historical Marxisms thus yields a positive result. That a Marxism is necessarily a philosophy as weIl as a science, means that it cannot but be a self-reflexive science: the point of (philosophical) reflexivity is the place of the loss ofthe (scientific) object, philosophically circumscribed by Adomo's dictum "The whole is the untrue," and until now only programatically defined in its scientific import by Althusser's indication that historical materialism should be the science of the production of the effect of the social. 2 The political dimension has thus a double and bizarre status within Marxisms: it is both their specific mode of theoretical production and eventually an alibi occulting their lack of theoretical elaboration. Some of the greatest moments in the history of Marxisms resulted from an articulation ofboth aspects, when the theoretical defeat was itself approached as a theoretical problem: e.g. the theoretical melancholy of Benjamin or Adorno, a strategy dictated by the Freudian "loss of the object"; or the psychotic mimicking of the dogmatic orthodox style in Althusser's texts, a strategy necessitated by the Lacanian "foreclosure ofthe master-signifier."
The Program
The present essay will follow this line of direct confrontation with theoretical failure, conceived as a theoretical problem, but in a Leninist style: according to which, problems of theory are immediately translated into problems of organization. Lenin has at least the merit of explicitly spelling out what most Marxists have been spontaneously doing; the logic of their reasoning has more oIe less been a paraphrase of Chico Marx's pun: "Ifyou have problems, join the party; then you'll have more problems, but at least you'll have the party." The profound intuition about the nature ofhuman institutions (the material existence ofideology, to use Althusser's formulation) condensed in these words, has mostly escaped Marxist thinkers: that is why their politics have tended to oscillate non-dialectically between doctrinary rigorism and pragmatic oppor-119 MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM theoretical enterprise. There are histories, but no History, there are interpretations of society, effects of the social, there may even be an effect of Society, but there is no Society proper. For a science that takes historical society as its object, the consequence is dramatic: the loss of its object is the first effect of its materialist conceptualization, Le. the first achievement of historical materialism. The second reason for the absence of a distinctive conceptual apparatus in the various Marxisms thus pertains to their scientific dimension, and results from the self-destruction of any object of knowledge that would pretend to correspond to a hypothetical real object (society, history) whose very existence is negated by the materialist scientific procedure itself.
The summing up of the prima vista negative unity of historical Marxisms thus yields a positive result. That a Marxism is necessarily a philosophy as weIl as a science, means that it cannot but be a self-reflexive science: the point of (philosophical) reflexivity is the place of the loss ofthe (scientific) object, philosophically circumscribed by Adomo's dictum "The whole is the untrue," and until now only programatically defined in its scientific import by Althusser's indication that historical materialism should be the science of the production of the effect of the social. The political dimension has thus a double and bizarre status within Marxisms: it is both their specific mode of theoretical production and eventually an alibi occulting their lack of theoretical elaboration. Some of the greatest moments in the history of Marxisms resulted from an articulation ofboth aspects, when the theoretical defeat was itself approached as a theoretical problem: e.g. the theoretical melancholy of Benjamin or Adorno, a strategy dictated by the Freudian "loss of the object"; or the psychotic mimicking of the dogmatic orthodox style in Althusser's texts, a strategy necessitated by the Lacanian "foreclosure ofthe master-signifier."
The present essay will follow this line of direct confrontation with theoretical failure, conceived as a theoretical problem, but in a Leninist style: according to which, problems of theory are immediately translated into problems of organization. Lenin has at least the merit of explicitly spelling out what most Marxists have been spontaneously doing; the logic of their reasoning has more oIe less been a paraphrase of Chico Marx's pun: "Ifyou have problems, join the party; then you'll have more problems, but at least you'll have the party." The profound intuition about the nature ofhuman institutions (the material existence ofideology, to use Althusser's formulation) condensed in these words, has mostly escaped Marxist thinkers: that is why their politics have tended to oscillate non-dialectically between doctrinary rigorism and pragmatic oppor-tunism, between bolshevism and social democracy. In the history of Marxism, the crucial question of the incidence of theoretical work upon the "shaping of human relations" has been relegated to the rituals of Party discipline, instead of being approached as an internal theoretical problem, viZe that of the ideological effects of theory. A similar problem has from the very beginning been confronted and elaborated in psychoanalytic practice, and Marxists may learn something from Octave Manoni's ironic judgment that the most conceptual contribution of the analyst to the analytic process is his silence.
If Marxisms are constitutively bound to their political dimension, then they should take serious account of Freud's remark that politics is, together with education and psychoanalysis, an "impossible" activity, since it hinges upon the phenomenon of transference. It is in this sense that "organization" is the central theme ofthe present essay: any human organizing, i.e. every social phenomenon, rests upon intersubjective relations, and therefore in some measure depends upon mechanisms of transference.
No materialist theory of i'deology can evade this point, and we will here try prudently to articulate a psychoanalytic conceptualization of the mechanisms of subjectivation with the Marxist legacy of the theory of ideology. Let us first sketch what might be considered a consensual "Marxist" starting point for this enterprise.
The totalizing effect of the Social, achieved through differentiated actions of one (Le. the dominating) party to the class conflict, mediates the operation of the economy of exploitation, whose successful performance depends on its functioning as if it were a whole: this "necessary appearance" (Marx) passes through individual consciousnesses in the form of ideological illusions.
3 It should be stressed that ideological illusion is not of the order of "psychological" delusion or prejudice, but has the status of, in Durkheimian terms, a social fact. A good example may be commodity fetishism: although bourgeois consciousness is typically nominalist and does not "believe in" the transubstantiation-mystique of commodity-value, it is the structure of the commodity-economy itself that is "realist," i.e. it constitutively encompasses the "real existence" of the "name of things," vize the general equivalent, money. It is "objectively" that relations among men take the form of relations among things, etc. Still, in securing the effect of the social, this ideological structure necessarily passes through, and is actively supported by, the social individual. The articulation of these two domains, the individual and the social, has traditionally been a pierre d'achoppement of "social science" -ever since the pioneering debate between Le Tarde's psychologism and Durkheim's collectivism. Historical materialism has indicated a way toward the solution of this problem by conceiving of the possibility of a theory of ideolo1 20 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL tunism, between bolshevism and social democracy. In the history of Marxism, the crucial question of the incidence of theoretical work upon the "shaping of human relations" has been relegated to the rituals of Party discipline, instead of being approached as an internal theoretical problem, viZe that of the ideological effects of theory. A similar problem has from the very beginning been confronted and elaborated in psychoanalytic practice, and Marxists may learn something from Octave Manoni's ironic judgment that the most conceptual contribution of the analyst to the analytic process is his silence.
3 It should be stressed that ideological illusion is not of the order of "psychological" delusion or prejudice, but has the status of, in Durkheimian terms, a social fact. A good example may be commodity fetishism: although bourgeois consciousness is typically nominalist and does not "believe in" the transubstantiation-mystique of commodity-value, it is the structure of the commodity-economy itself that is "realist," i.e. it constitutively encompasses the "real existence" of the "name of things," vize the general equivalent, money. It is "objectively" that relations among men take the form of relations among things, etc. Still, in securing the effect of the social, this ideological structure necessarily passes through, and is actively supported by, the social individual. The articulation of these two domains, the individual and the social, has traditionally been a pierre d'achoppement of "social science" -ever since the pioneering debate between Le Tarde's psychologism and Durkheim's collectivism. Historical materialism has indicated a way toward the solution of this problem by conceiving of the possibility of a theory of ideolo1 Thus far, however, this way has been marked by sueeessive failures to avoid eertain impasses into whieh it ean lead.
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On the following pages, we will propose a prolegomena to the future elaboration of this critical eonjuncture. Our method will be to apply a Marxist, i.e., critical, strategy to Marxisms themselves: in a tacit polemies with Habermas' "post-Marxist" theory of eommunieative action, we hope thereby to develop the unexploited theoretieal potential of Althusser's notion of ideologieal interpellation. We will treat Althusser's formulation as an intuitive and un-differentiated description of the problem and Habermas' as a politically well-intentioned naivism, whose background notion of the Lebenswelt should be discounted as an idealist hermeneutic residuum. Before proceeding to the task at hand, it may help us to counter the provocative question of "Whither Marxism?", as weIl as to bring into sharper focus our present project, if we take the opportunity explicitly to speIl out the main differences separating Habermas' theory of communicative action from our own ideas about the theory of ideology. Put in a "neutral" way, the principal difference is that we aim to cover the same field as Habermas ("universal pragmatics") with a more ascetic conceptual inventory: with fewer and more powerful concepts. Our project of devising a stronger theory neeessarily implies an overall reconeeptualization of the problematic -and here the "neutrality" of the divergency ends: for the conceptual profligacy of Habermas's theory seems to be a consequence of his basically over-rationalist approach, which, in turn, seems to be an ideological effect of a non-thematized extra-theoretic political program.
We ean easily demonstrate our point with reference to Habermas' elaborate typology of actions: strategie action, which is opposed to communicative action, is further sub-divided into overt and covert strategie action; covert strategie action has then, in turn, two sub-species: conscious deception (manipulation) and unconseious deception. In the later case, the agent is supposed wrongly to take herlhirnself to be engaged in a communieative action, whereas s/he is being unconsciously led by her/his egoistic interests (and thereby is in fact engaged in a strategie action). The most trivial, typical and "normal" situation, an agent's selfdelusion as to her/his "real" motives, is thus treated as a sub-species of a sub-species within a basically moralistic classifieatory framework, and is then relegated to the highly suspicious eategory of individual "psychic pathologies." Besides complicating the conceptual apparatus and giving rise to the typical empirieist illusion of the impotence of theory confronting the "richness of empirical material," this line of reasoning prevents theorization of the central ideological phenomenon, vize the selfdelusion itself, and blocks any serious consideration of the productive 121 MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM Thus far, however, this way has been marked by sueeessive failures to avoid eertain impasses into whieh it ean lead.
We ean easily demonstrate our point with reference to Habermas' elaborate typology of actions: strategie action, which is opposed to communicative action, is further sub-divided into overt and covert strategie action; covert strategie action has then, in turn, two sub-species: conscious deception (manipulation) and unconseious deception. In the later case, the agent is supposed wrongly to take herlhirnself to be engaged in a communieative action, whereas s/he is being unconsciously led by her/his egoistic interests (and thereby is in fact engaged in a strategie action). The most trivial, typical and "normal" situation, an agent's selfdelusion as to her/his "real" motives, is thus treated as a sub-species of a sub-species within a basically moralistic classifieatory framework, and is then relegated to the highly suspicious eategory of individual "psychic pathologies." Besides complicating the conceptual apparatus and giving rise to the typical empirieist illusion of the impotence of theory confronting the "richness of empirical material," this line of reasoning prevents theorization of the central ideological phenomenon, vize the selfdelusion itself, and blocks any serious consideration of the productive force of ideological illusion. In our optics, the agent is the first to be "deceived" by her/his own action, and the pertinent opposition is not between honesty and deceit, but between conscious and unconscious. Since the type of rationality supporting a paradigmatic communicative action has to be accepted by the involved parties as "neutral, universal," and since, on the other hand, "neutrality" is precisely a constitutive effect of any successful (partial, "interested") ideological mechanism, it can by definition never be such -"unconscious deceit" is necessarily the essential, neutral (sit venia verbo) component of any social transaction. We could almost say that it is la condition humaine itself -even so, if we want to theorize it, we should begin by giving up the moralistic vocabulary.
Of course, with his "communicative action," Habermas describes the way that people should preferably chose to comport themselves in their transactions with others. But the positivist tour he takes in describing it cannot be dismissed as a mere rhetorical device, since Habermas is clearly the first to be "deceived" by his own rhetoric.
Habermas' almost hygienic over-rationalization of communication results in the counterfactual imposition of excessively strong conditions upon it: his validity-conditions are clearly too restrictive to account for most instances of actual communicative interaction. We will propose a much weaker condition (a possible-belief condition instead ofvalidityconditions) that can support a much stronger theory.5
Habermas' procedure seems a final negative counterpart to the inaugural productive contradiction of Kant's What is Enlightenment? Kant supports his apology for enlightenment by reference to the event of the French Revolution, whose historical importance he deduces not from its mere "factualness," but from the impression this event made on humanity (i.e. it was greeted with enthusiasm). Hence, it is what people believe about the French Revolution that makes it what it "is" -and the form of Kant's argument, with its essential dependence upon a belief-factor, thus contradicts the enlightened thesis which it is supposed to be an argument fore But while Kant's paradox makes his text theoretically productive, Habermas' unwillingness to recognize the paradox of his own enlightened position (in order to rationalize human interaction, he has first to change beliefinto knowledge, which necessitates the introduction of a rigid typology of interaction that, in effect, cuts off the possibility of producing knowledge about it) ruins his theoretical project and undermines his political commitment. Although enlightenment may still be of some political value, it is theoretically disastrous if taken without distance and irony, i.e. without thematization.
That Habermas is taken for a champion of "post-Marxism" in present academic ideology, may weIl serve to warn us that this term masks 122 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL force of ideological illusion. In our optics, the agent is the first to be "deceived" by her/his own action, and the pertinent opposition is not between honesty and deceit, but between conscious and unconscious. Since the type of rationality supporting a paradigmatic communicative action has to be accepted by the involved parties as "neutral, universal," and since, on the other hand, "neutrality" is precisely a constitutive effect of any successful (partial, "interested") ideological mechanism, it can by definition never be such -"unconscious deceit" is necessarily the essential, neutral (sit venia verbo) component of any social transaction. We could almost say that it is la condition humaine itself -even so, if we want to theorize it, we should begin by giving up the moralistic vocabulary.
That Habermas is taken for a champion of "post-Marxism" in present academic ideology, may weIl serve to warn us that this term masks a theoretical regression to basically pre-Marxist positions. Within the same fashionable trend, the over-complicated conceptual apparatus of Habermas has an inverted counterpart in Laclau and Mouffe's simplified social semiotics, wherein everything derives from the one relation of "equivalence."6 Although Laclau and Mouffe's proposal is intellectually inferior to Habermas' theory, being basically a second-hand marketing of "post-structuralist" ideology, it is its legitimate ideological counterpart within the "post-Marxist" trend, since both projects miss, in a symetrically inverted way, the fundamental theoretical discovery of classical Marxism: vize the over-determination and the specific tension among different social instances, especially between the ideological and economic spheres -a tension whose result is precisely the effect of a social "totality." (To the question of "Wherefore Marxism?", a first answer already presents itself: "To help us out ofpost-Marxism.")
The Trans-subjective Existence of Ideology
That ideology is a discourse not dependent on any individual instance can easily be shown if we consider utterances of the following kind:
(1) 1 believe in God.
(2) 1 believe in democracy. (3) 1 believe in beauty.
(1) can be interpreted as "I believe that God exists."; (2) as "I believe that democracy has the favourable effects generally ascribed to it."; (3) may have a variety of different interpretations, according to the aesthetic doctrine the interpreter embraces. There is not even a common "propositional scheme" to (1) -(3), let alone a stricter constraint as to their interpretation. Yet utterances like these present no difficulty for understanding, although it is obvious that not only their interpretation, but also their performance demand much more than what is inherent to their immediate contents.
(4) 1 believe in the community ofSaints.
Although transparent at the properly linguistic level, (4) does not say much to anyone who does not know what Catholics or Eastern Orthodox believe. Phenomena of this kind not only indicate that the ideological discourse is pre-existent to any particular ideological transaction, but they also show that, in order to participate in these transactions, an individual has to be already "plugged into" this preexistent discourse.
Habermas would say that, in order for communication to be successful, relevant ideologies have to be, in some way, part ofboth the speaker's and the interpreter's Lebenswelt; Althusser would speak about their a theoretical regression to basically pre-Marxist positions. Within the same fashionable trend, the over-complicated conceptual apparatus of Habermas has an inverted counterpart in Laclau and Mouffe's simplified social semiotics, wherein everything derives from the one relation of "equivalence."6 Although Laclau and Mouffe's proposal is intellectually inferior to Habermas' theory, being basically a second-hand marketing of "post-structuralist" ideology, it is its legitimate ideological counterpart within the "post-Marxist" trend, since both projects miss, in a symetrically inverted way, the fundamental theoretical discovery of classical Marxism: vize the over-determination and the specific tension among different social instances, especially between the ideological and economic spheres -a tension whose result is precisely the effect of a social "totality." (To the question of "Wherefore Marxism?", a first answer already presents itself: "To help us out ofpost-Marxism.")
Habermas would say that, in order for communication to be successful, relevant ideologies have to be, in some way, part ofboth the speaker's and the interpreter's Lebenswelt; Althusser would speak about their having to be interpellated by the same ideology. Habermas' formulation is too weak (a whoIe life in predominantly Catholic surroundings may not qualify you to understand [4]); Althusser's too strong (you do not have in fact to be a Christian to understand [4]). In order to "make sense" (while speaking or while interpreting), it is not necessary actually to believe certain things, one has only to be aware that it is possible to believe this or that. (The Orthodox contest the Catholic dogma of "filioque" precisely because they find themselves confronted with definite proof that it is possible, even though in their opinion wrong, to believe that the Holy Spirit emanates both from the Father and from the Son.)
Successful communication does not depend on the involved parties' consent to its ideological premises, but rather on their consensus that exchanged utterances are intelligible. This purely formal and contentsfree operation may only ex post facta induce an individual to swallow more ofthe ideological contents than s/he had ever intended. In relation to Althusser's notion of ideological interpellation, the view presented here has the advantage of putting the interpellated individual into an active position, for s/he actually demands the sense s/he acquires by responding to interpellation (having at least the theoretical possibility of refusing to respond). This view also breaks the vicious circle of Habermas' Lebenswelt hermeneutics, according to which an individual may submit to interpellation only under the condition of having always already submitted to it. Finally, it leads to a stricter formulation of Pecheux's "Münchausen effect"7 ofideology: the ability ofideology to proceed, as it were, ex nihilo, and to lay down its own foundation after the establishment of the "superstructures" (i.e. to produce the cause out of the effect).
The Subject Supposed to Believe (5) Waldheim and the Austrians are deeply hurt.
The "proper" ideological way to interpret (5) is not to wonder about the possible homonymy ofthe predicate ("hurt in one's feelings"/ "hurt in one's international interests"), but to take it at face value: to start from the supposition that it may make sense as offered. Just as the speaker of (5) supposes that slhe means it, so the interpreter supposes that it is possible to believe that (5) has an interpretation which is accessible in a relatively uncomplicated way. The communicational solidarity rests upon the identification of the two agents with the instance of this supposed belief, the subject supposed to believe, which mediates their communicational "reciprocity." The introduction ofthis simple concept enables us to do without "communicational principles" and conversational para-rules 124 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL having to be interpellated by the same ideology. Habermas' formulation is too weak (a whoIe life in predominantly Catholic surroundings may not qualify you to understand [4]); Althusser's too strong (you do not have in fact to be a Christian to understand [4]). In order to "make sense" (while speaking or while interpreting), it is not necessary actually to believe certain things, one has only to be aware that it is possible to believe this or that. (The Orthodox contest the Catholic dogma of "filioque" precisely because they find themselves confronted with definite proof that it is possible, even though in their opinion wrong, to believe that the Holy Spirit emanates both from the Father and from the Son.)
The "proper" ideological way to interpret (5) is not to wonder about the possible homonymy ofthe predicate ("hurt in one's feelings"/ "hurt in one's international interests"), but to take it at face value: to start from the supposition that it may make sense as offered. Just as the speaker of (5) supposes that slhe means it, so the interpreter supposes that it is possible to believe that (5) has an interpretation which is accessible in a relatively uncomplicated way. The communicational solidarity rests upon the identification of the two agents with the instance of this supposed belief, the subject supposed to believe, which mediates their communicational "reciprocity." The introduction ofthis simple concept enables us to do without "communicational principles" and conversational para-rules oftheories ala Grice, as weIl as without Habermas' burdensome apparatus of strategie and communicative actions. Both of the latter conceptualizations may be deduced from it, although their introduction does not in fact seem necessary at all: since the most important advantage of this concept is that it covers the most frequent and "normal" cases of a mixed nature, and, above all, that it provides for the cases wherein the eventual "manipulator" (the speaker) is the first "dupe" ofhislher own ideology.8
In the case of (5), this identification, which is a formal necessity in every act of communication, has the effect of producing a new semantic trait: "being hurt in an Austro-Waldheimian way." The production ofspecific ideological contents thus follows directly {rom a formal-universal communicational constraint. The newly produced semantic feature, "describing" a specific affective state (precisely the state that provided the material basis of the outcome of the last presidential election in Austria), functions as the Freudian einziger Zug of mass psychology: the trait by which members of the same imaginary community recognize each other, identify with each other, because, by the same token, every one of them identifies herlhimself with the "Leader."9 This whole complex and specific ideological mechanism, which assembles a certain community and produces the specific hegemonic effect of Society, derives from the purely formal communicational constraint that requires interpreters to assume the same interpretational "point ofview."lO An individual's "being interpellated" by (5) results from hislher "spontaneous" submission to the abstract formal principles (constraints) of everyday (trivial) conversational economy. However, the conditions of an individual's positive response to ideological interpellation are usually more complex.
The Phantasy
(6) You have missed the boat for Eureka.
There are two possible interpretations of (6) and, for each of them, the interpreter is able to offer a justification. Typically, such a justification will take the form of a minimal description of the intersubjective structure that supports herlhis understanding. We may call this "description" a principle of interpretation. (6), then, either may be decoded according to the principle "the speaker is addressing me as a tourist travelling to Eureka," or to the principle "the speaker is addressing me as a Yugoslav worried about the course followed by his country in the international division of scientific research." The principle of interpretation indicates how the interpreter construes herlhis identification with the subject supposed to believe; it indicates "under what angle" slhe takes this identification. But, although the principle of interpretation 125 MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM oftheories ala Grice, as weIl as without Habermas' burdensome apparatus of strategie and communicative actions. Both of the latter conceptualizations may be deduced from it, although their introduction does not in fact seem necessary at all: since the most important advantage of this concept is that it covers the most frequent and "normal" cases of a mixed nature, and, above all, that it provides for the cases wherein the eventual "manipulator" (the speaker) is the first "dupe" ofhislher own ideology.8
There are two possible interpretations of (6) and, for each of them, the interpreter is able to offer a justification. Typically, such a justification will take the form of a minimal description of the intersubjective structure that supports herlhis understanding. We may call this "description" a principle of interpretation. (6), then, either may be decoded according to the principle "the speaker is addressing me as a tourist travelling to Eureka," or to the principle "the speaker is addressing me as a Yugoslav worried about the course followed by his country in the international division of scientific research." The principle of interpretation indicates how the interpreter construes herlhis identification with the subject supposed to believe; it indicates "under what angle" slhe takes this identification. But, although the principle of interpretation may be a valid post festum justification on the interpreter's part, it does not clarify how the interpreter has arrived at hislher interpretation. The interpreter can decipher the meaning of an utterance if slhe is able to produce a suitable definition of the intersubjective situation; but since the only available evidence of this structure is its cause, i.e. the utterance under interpretation, the interpreter seems to be trapped in as vicious circle: the key to the meaning of an utterance is the definition of the intersubjective structure and this structure is defined by the meaning of the utterance. (It would be of no help here to bring in "the context," for the context simply means more utterances.) How then does a certain principle of interpretation "impose itself" on the interpreter -or, better said, how does it happen that the communicating parties find themselves always already "trapped into" a certain intersubjective situation, even though they are, in a certain sense, producing and reproducing it by their very communicational activity? (7) I won't be the first President to lose a war.
There are two possible interpretations of this utterance of Lyndon Baines Johnson,ll depending on two different principles ofinterpretation:
(7-a) L.B.J. has a particular interpretation ofU.S. history. (7-b) The U.S. has never lost a war.
According to our prima vista criterion that the principle of interpretation should be a proposition referring both to the utterance and to its situational context, (7-a) has a much better chance ofimposing itselfthan (7-b); nonetheless, it seems to us (and history has in fact demonstrated) that (7-b) is the ideologically privileged interpretation. To say that (7-b) is being imposed by the dominant ideology is not an answer, it only sharpens the question: what makes for the force of the dominant ideology?
It would be tempting to say that the advantage of the dominant ideology over others comes from its being a mediation ofthe dominant relations of production. But this is no solution, for it makes the dominant ideology depend upon the dominant relations of production which, in turn, depend upon the dominant ideology. For the modest purpose of this present essay, it is therefore wiser to limit ourselves to the realm of ideology, and to investigate in concreto the implications of our last example.
The advantage of(7-b) over (7-a) seems to reside in its being universal and void, i.e. in its inviting an intuitive agreement and its precluding an analytical approach. On the other hand, (7-a) already implicitly refers to (7-b) as to a "universally accepted truth" that can only be challenged with the aid of specific justification: this is precisely the relation between a dominant and a non-hegemonic ideology, in which the dominant ideolo-126 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL may be a valid post festum justification on the interpreter's part, it does not clarify how the interpreter has arrived at hislher interpretation. The interpreter can decipher the meaning of an utterance if slhe is able to produce a suitable definition of the intersubjective situation; but since the only available evidence of this structure is its cause, i.e. the utterance under interpretation, the interpreter seems to be trapped in as vicious circle: the key to the meaning of an utterance is the definition of the intersubjective structure and this structure is defined by the meaning of the utterance. (It would be of no help here to bring in "the context," for the context simply means more utterances.) How then does a certain principle of interpretation "impose itself" on the interpreter -or, better said, how does it happen that the communicating parties find themselves always already "trapped into" a certain intersubjective situation, even though they are, in a certain sense, producing and reproducing it by their very communicational activity? (7) I won't be the first President to lose a war.
The advantage of(7-b) over (7-a) seems to reside in its being universal and void, i.e. in its inviting an intuitive agreement and its precluding an analytical approach. On the other hand, (7-a) already implicitly refers to (7-b) as to a "universally accepted truth" that can only be challenged with the aid of specific justification: this is precisely the relation between a dominant and a non-hegemonic ideology, in which the dominant ideolo-gy defines the field of argument in advance, while the burden ofjustification falls upon the subordinated ideology.
In cases like (7-b), we come across the tenacity of commonplaces, and may find a clue toward the resolution of our problem in what seems to be their most confusing feature: vize their utter irrationality. The extreme cases of racial prejudice, nationalistic hatred or sexual chauvinism demonstrate that such stereotypes cannot possibly be accepted except in the modality ofsheer belief To the interpreter, they pose a radical dilemma: is this pure nonsense or ... is it to be believed? If the interpreter adopts a spontaneous (i.e. ideologieal) attitude, herlhis desire is to save the meaningfulness of the utterance which, regardless ofthe ehoiee taken as to the radieal dilemma, forces her/him into the position: eredo quia absurdum.
We are now in the position to distinguish two elements within the ad hoc concept of the principle of interpretation: one is the definition a speaker or an interpreter herlhimself gives of the communicational situation (this component has all the characteristics of a "rationalization"); the other is its belief-nucleus, the element that comprises the formal necessity that the situation so defined be an object of belief. This character ofthe second component makes ofit a point at which desire (that an utterance be meaningful) and eonstraint (the compulsion to believe) eoineide. It has, then, the structure ofthe Freudianphantasy.
Having introduced the concept of phantasy, we can and must refine our notion of the interpretational principle: insofar as it is the justification that the interpreter can provide for herlhis interpretation of an utterance, a principle ofinterpretation depends on the interpreter's identification with the subject supposed to believe; this is ideology in the familiar sense (systematization, rationalization, self-delusion, etc.). But since it depends specifically upon a mechanism oftransference (identification), the principle of interpretation necessarily comprises an articulation of soeial demand (the basic relation of a subject to the other) with individual desire (the basic relation of a subject to her/himself, i.e., the level of the constitution of the subject). The locus of this articulation is the second component ofthe interpretational principle: its belief-nucleus or, in Freudian terms, the phantasy. AB a formal matrix of the sense/nonsense alternative that both imposes the constraint ofbelief on the subject and responds to herlhis desire,12 the phantasy is the material basis ofthe identification process -for it is a subject-constitutive phantasy. To the formal criterion for the success ofideological interpellation (that it should open into the sense/nonsense alternative), we must therefore add yet another: if a phantasy is to be socially (Le. ideologically) operative, it must be capable of mobilizing the always idiosyncratic unconscious 127 MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM gy defines the field of argument in advance, while the burden ofjustification falls upon the subordinated ideology.
Having introduced the concept of phantasy, we can and must refine our notion of the interpretational principle: insofar as it is the justification that the interpreter can provide for herlhis interpretation of an utterance, a principle ofinterpretation depends on the interpreter's identification with the subject supposed to believe; this is ideology in the familiar sense (systematization, rationalization, self-delusion, etc.). But since it depends specifically upon a mechanism oftransference (identification), the principle of interpretation necessarily comprises an articulation of soeial demand (the basic relation of a subject to the other) with individual desire (the basic relation of a subject to her/himself, i.e., the level of the constitution of the subject). The locus of this articulation is the second component ofthe interpretational principle: its belief-nucleus or, in Freudian terms, the phantasy. AB a formal matrix of the sense/nonsense alternative that both imposes the constraint ofbelief on the subject and responds to herlhis desire,12 the phantasy is the material basis ofthe identification process -for it is a subject-constitutive phantasy. To the formal criterion for the success ofideological interpellation (that it should open into the sense/nonsense alternative), we must therefore add yet another: if a phantasy is to be socially (Le. ideologically) operative, it must be capable of mobilizing the always idiosyncratic unconscious phantasies ofthe individual. It must be able to function as cloaca maxima draining individual phantasies into a social dimension.
Much has been said about the relationship between ideology and reality, and, symptomatically, no attempt to define this relationship can avoid some degree of contradiction.
13 Such necessary contradiction derives from the contradictory nature of ideology itself -from its being a part of the very reality upon which it "operates." Apart from Engel's model of Wiederspiegeln and Althusser's concept of representation imaginaire, there is a much better way to think this paradoxical "relation," a way which not only embraces both these formulations but also has the advantage of not presupposing a difference in nature between ideology and the material upon which it operates: this is to think ideology through the Freudian concept of sekundäre Bearbeitung. (Sekundäre Bearbeitung is usually translated as "secondary revision": although this translation underscores an important dimension of the concept, we prefer the more literal translation -"secondary elaboration").
VI. Ideology as Secondary Elaboration
Secondary elaboration is a dream mechanism that unifies the dream material. 14 Freud describes it, almost in a Marxist style, as a "tendentious revision,"15 and has some trouble situating it. 16 This difficulty derives from the nature of secondary elaboration:
1. On the one hand, it is already an interpretation: it interprets the results ofthe dream-work, and is therefore no part ofit. 2. On the other hand, it is a tendentious or a deformed interpretation; the character of distortion thus assimilating it to the dream-work itself.
Secondary elaboration thus presents a certain sense of the dream -but it is a false sense. Without it, the dream is a heap of disconnected fragments -with it, the dream has asense, but not the true one. Through secondary elaboration, we get asense, but this is not the sense of the dream -indeed it makes us lose the sense. The only motive for secondary elaboration is the claim of intelligibility of the dream material; and its only achievement is a falsification of what is there to be understood. The fascinating result of secondary elaboration is that intelligibility blocks understanding.
Freud stresses that "before we start upon the analysis of a dream, we have to clear the ground of this attempt at an interpretation," and explains this paradox by way of an analogy: 128 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL phantasies ofthe individual. It must be able to function as cloaca maxima draining individual phantasies into a social dimension.
Freud stresses that "before we start upon the analysis of a dream, we have to clear the ground of this attempt at an interpretation," and explains this paradox by way of an analogy: It [the secondary elaboration] beh~ves towards the dream-content lying before it just as our normal psychic activity behaves in general towards any perceptual content that may be presented to it. It understands that content on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even in the moment ofperceiving it, on the presupposition ofits being intelligible; in so doing, it runs a risk offalsifying it, and in fact, ifit cannot bring it into line with anything familiar, is prey to the strangest misunderstandings. As is weIl known, we are incapable of seeing a series of unfamiliar signs or of hearing a succession of unknown words, without at once falsifying the perception from considerations of inteIligibility, on the basis of something already known to US. 17 This is Freud the materialist at work: the whole is the untrue. The analogy with the Marxian problem of the illusion of totality resulting from ideological totalization, is in fact more than an analogy. The illusion of totality is a "lie," but this "lie" is apart of the non-totalizable material itself. Dreams, dictated by sexual desire, are as non-totalizable as society; torn and constituted by class struggle. "Structure" is not a whole precisely because the illusion of its wholeness is apart of it. This is, of course, only the leftist element in Freud; to stop here would be to yield to the infantile disorder ofmaterialism. Freud's genius was to carry the analysis further, and to do so, he was obliged to introduce a new concept: the concept of Phantasie, wishful phantasy.
The interpretation presented by th.e secondary elaboration is a false interpretation; insofar as as it is false, it is no interpretation, it is apart of the dream-work; and insofar as it is apart of the dream-work, it is a part of the truth of the dream: therefore, the result of the secondary elaboration is "true" precisely rand only) inasmuch as it is ''false.'' Although this may be an excessively logicist deduction, it nevertheless exactly reproduces Freud's point: what is false in the distorting operation is not the distortion itself, but its interpretational character. It is the "consideration ofintelligibility," the claim of a "sense," that is "false."
According to Freud, the secondary elaboration builds up a fa~ade of coherence for the dream: this fa~ade has to be broken in order to get at the latent dream-content. Nonetheless, this does not mean the facade should be discounted; for its framework is not accidental, but rather represents a certain sort of appropriation of already prepared dream material:
It would be amistake, however, to suppose that these dream-facades are nothing other than mistaken and somewhat arbitrary revisions of the dream-content by the conscious agency of our mentalIife. In the erection of a dream-facade, use is not infrequently made of wishful phantasies which are present in the dream-thoughts in a preconstructed form, and are of the same character as the appropriately named 'day dreams' familiar to us in waking life. The wishful phantasies revealed by analysis in night-dreams often turn out to be repetitions or modified versions of scenes from infancy; thus, in some cases,
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It [the secondary elaboration] beh~ves towards the dream-content lying before it just as our normal psychic activity behaves in general towards any perceptual content that may be presented to it. It understands that content on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even in the moment ofperceiving it, on the presupposition ofits being intelligible; in so doing, it runs a risk offalsifying it, and in fact, ifit cannot bring it into line with anything familiar, is prey to the strangest misunderstandings. As is weIl known, we are incapable of seeing a series of unfamiliar signs or of hearing a succession of unknown words, without at once falsifying the perception from considerations of inteIligibility, on the basis of something already known to US. 17 This is Freud the materialist at work: the whole is the untrue. The analogy with the Marxian problem of the illusion of totality resulting from ideological totalization, is in fact more than an analogy. The illusion of totality is a "lie," but this "lie" is apart of the non-totalizable material itself. Dreams, dictated by sexual desire, are as non-totalizable as society; torn and constituted by class struggle. "Structure" is not a whole precisely because the illusion of its wholeness is apart of it. This is, of course, only the leftist element in Freud; to stop here would be to yield to the infantile disorder ofmaterialism. Freud's genius was to carry the analysis further, and to do so, he was obliged to introduce a new concept: the concept of Phantasie, wishful phantasy.
It would be amistake, however, to suppose that these dream-facades are nothing other than mistaken and somewhat arbitrary revisions of the dream-content by the conscious agency of our mentalIife. In the erection of a dream-facade, use is not infrequently made of wishful phantasies which are present in the dream-thoughts in a preconstructed form, and are of the same character as the appropriately named 'day dreams' familiar to us in waking life. The wishful phantasies revealed by analysis in night-dreams often turn out to be repetitions or modified versions of scenes from infancy; thus, in some cases, the facade of the dream directly reveals the dream's actual nucleus, distorted by an admixture of other material. 18 Now there is one case in which it is to a great extent spared the labour of, as it were, building up a facade of the dream -the case, namely, in which a formation of that kind already exists, available for use in the material of the dream-thoughts. I am in the habit of describing the element in the dream-thoughts which I have in mind as a "phantasy" ["Phantasie"]. 19 The phantasy is thus what Lacan calls the point de capiton, the quilting (or "anchoring") point, an element common both to the fa~ade and to what it conceals.
The response to an ideological interpellation is also made in the name of a claim of sense: it is this "presupposition of intelligibility" that pushes the interpellated individual towards an identification with the subject supposed to believe. The active part played by the interpellated individual consists precisely in herlhis helping to establish a "fa~ade" -an ideological effect of coherence. The interpellated individual does indeed interpret "on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas": but s/he ascribes them to the subject supposed to believe, and thus confers upon them an apriori social status. Misunderstanding and falsification are, of course, always possible, but this possibility has a positive theoretical significance: it demonstrates that every interpretation, be it adequate to the "original" speaker's intention or not, is socially, Le. ideologically, motivated, and, in this sense (and on this level), the interpreting individual is always already a subject, that is, has always already been interpellated byan ideology. This level (of the Lebenswelt, of the background beliefs ascribed to the subject supposed to believe) presupposes the interpellation as already "consummated," and its contents are in part trivial and abstract 20 and in part ideologically specific. In (5), the trivial and abstract (ideologically non-specific) part of the background beliefs would, among others, comprise the belief in the existence of certain kinds of mental events or states (emotions), the postulation of a causal relation between certain events in the "outer" world (like the banning of Waldheim from the U.S.A.) and certain types of unpleasant emotions, etc.; the ideologically specific belief-background would consist of an intimatist notion of politicallife (a typical example of"reified consciousness" ala Goldmann) and, of course, the newly produced semantic feature. The individual act of identification with the social instance of the subject supposed to believe (the Althusserian Subject of ideology) makes the individual accede to the social dimension of ideological beliefs (Habermas' Lebenswelt) and assume them for herlhis account. But the act ofidentification is impossible if it cannot find an anchor for the individual's 130 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL the facade of the dream directly reveals the dream's actual nucleus, distorted by an admixture of other material. 18 Now there is one case in which it is to a great extent spared the labour of, as it were, building up a facade of the dream -the case, namely, in which a formation of that kind already exists, available for use in the material of the dream-thoughts. I am in the habit of describing the element in the dream-thoughts which I have in mind as a "phantasy" ["Phantasie"]. 19 The phantasy is thus what Lacan calls the point de capiton, the quilting (or "anchoring") point, an element common both to the fa~ade and to what it conceals.
The response to an ideological interpellation is also made in the name of a claim of sense: it is this "presupposition of intelligibility" that pushes the interpellated individual towards an identification with the subject supposed to believe. The active part played by the interpellated individual consists precisely in herlhis helping to establish a "fa~ade" -an ideological effect of coherence. The interpellated individual does indeed interpret "on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas": but s/he ascribes them to the subject supposed to believe, and thus confers upon them an apriori social status. Misunderstanding and falsification are, of course, always possible, but this possibility has a positive theoretical significance: it demonstrates that every interpretation, be it adequate to the "original" speaker's intention or not, is socially, Le. ideologically, motivated, and, in this sense (and on this level), the interpreting individual is always already a subject, that is, has always already been interpellated byan ideology. This level (of the Lebenswelt, of the background beliefs ascribed to the subject supposed to believe) presupposes the interpellation as already "consummated," and its contents are in part trivial and abstract 20 and in part ideologically specific. In (5), the trivial and abstract (ideologically non-specific) part of the background beliefs would, among others, comprise the belief in the existence of certain kinds of mental events or states (emotions), the postulation of a causal relation between certain events in the "outer" world (like the banning of Waldheim from the U.S.A.) and certain types of unpleasant emotions, etc.; the ideologically specific belief-background would consist of an intimatist notion of politicallife (a typical example of"reified consciousness" ala Goldmann) and, of course, the newly produced semantic feature. The individual act of identification with the social instance of the subject supposed to believe (the Althusserian Subject of ideology) makes the individual accede to the social dimension of ideological beliefs (Habermas' Lebenswelt) and assume them for herlhis account. But the act ofidentification is impossible if it cannot find an anchor for the individual's idiosyncratic "wishful phantasies" within the socially "pre-existent" belief-background -if the utterance offered for interpretation does not touch upon the individual's (unconscious) subjectivating phantasy. The general, abstract and socially-oriented demand for sense must find a way of translating itself into the individual's unconscious and particular desire, catalyzed by her/his phantasy. This is an absolute condition for the success of an ideological interpellation. The phantasy (which is a "petrified" string of signifiers, open to different interpretations that depend on different successive libidinal organizations in the history of the subject 21 ) is thus an element that has a double status: it figures in the "fa~ade" of coherence Cour principle of interpretation), in the conscious belief-network that "rationalizes" the identification-process, as weIl as in the individual's unconscious desire. The phantasy is the point at which the conscious demand for sense translates itself into the subject's unconscious desire which supports the act ofidentification. We can represent the interpellation-process by way of areversal of Lacan's scheme of the analytic process: Lacan's scheme The scheme of ideological interpellation In Lacan's scheme, the subject's message returns to her/himself in an inverted form, because the vector of the (conscious) demand "turns around" the point of transference (the subject supposed to know) and comes back to the subject as herlhis (unconscious) desire. The interpellation-process runs in the opposite direction: the subject's (conscious) demand hits upon the point of phantasy, there translates itself into the (unconscious) desire which supports the identification with the subject supposed to believe (the Subject ofideology), and returns to the individual subject as this Subject's interpellation. We could say that in the ideological process, the individual's demand "bounces off" the Subject of ideology and returns to the individual subject in a non-inverted form -the 131 MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM idiosyncratic "wishful phantasies" within the socially "pre-existent" belief-background -if the utterance offered for interpretation does not touch upon the individual's (unconscious) subjectivating phantasy. The general, abstract and socially-oriented demand for sense must find a way of translating itself into the individual's unconscious and particular desire, catalyzed by her/his phantasy. This is an absolute condition for the success of an ideological interpellation. The phantasy (which is a "petrified" string of signifiers, open to different interpretations that depend on different successive libidinal organizations in the history of the subject 21 ) is thus an element that has a double status: it figures in the "fa~ade" of coherence Cour principle of interpretation), in the conscious belief-network that "rationalizes" the identification-process, as weIl as in the individual's unconscious desire. The phantasy is the point at which the conscious demand for sense translates itself into the subject's unconscious desire which supports the act ofidentification. We can represent the interpellation-process by way of areversal of Lacan's scheme of the analytic process: Lacan's scheme The scheme of ideological interpellation In Lacan's scheme, the subject's message returns to her/himself in an inverted form, because the vector of the (conscious) demand "turns around" the point of transference (the subject supposed to know) and comes back to the subject as herlhis (unconscious) desire. The interpellation-process runs in the opposite direction: the subject's (conscious) demand hits upon the point of phantasy, there translates itself into the (unconscious) desire which supports the identification with the subject supposed to believe (the Subject ofideology), and returns to the individual subject as this Subject's interpellation. We could say that in the ideological process, the individual's demand "bounces off" the Subject of ideology and returns to the individual subject in a non-inverted form -the uneonseious trajeetory "phantasy -+ desire -+ identification," which is the mechanism of subjectivation, being the material "basis" ofthis proeess.
Ideology as an effort to build up a "facade" of coherence, as a totalizing enterprise guided by "considerations of intelligibility," does not then work directly upon social "reality": it "works upon" the phantasy, and its effort aims at incorporating the phantasy. Within the coherence-fa~adeof ideology, the phantasy represents the non-totalizable nature ofthe social strueture (without going into details, let us just remark that our theory entails an ironie reformulation ofEngels' and Althusser's formulae). The element of phantasy is typically void of any explicit class-content or tendency23 and presents the same confusing mixture of universal pretension and singular idiocy as the Freudian Phantasie. (An analysis of (5) would probably point to the phantasy of the "humiliated father"; in (7), we referred to the phantasy of Western empire. We could put on the same list the phantasy of the decline of the West, or the phantasy of Oriental despotism, and any number of racist stereotypes.) Being a quilting point, the phantasy punctually eonnects the ideological fa~ade with the specific exterior: the so-ealled social reality. It is typically an inert string of signifiers, eapable of being inserted into different fa~ade interpretations; behind this set of signifiers, there is "nothing" -nothing but the hiatus that makes the social strueture unwhole, the hiatus of the class-struggle.
Being a cover that covers a hole in the whole, the phantasy is what is "the most real" in an ideology. The "test ofreality" for an ideology consists in its capacity to incorporate this obturator into a convineing (coherent, unifying) ideological fa~ade: therefore, many eonflicting ideologies may compete around the same phantasy -offering diverse elass-interested interpretations ofthis non-sensical marker ofthe class struggle. It is their incorporation of the phantasy that guarantees them the "appropriate" intermediary distance from "reality": ideologies do not situate themselves en face to social reality, they construe it around the absence of the social "real" (in the Lacanian sense), the class struggle, marked in their discourse by a stereotype, the phantasy. This is why ideologieal eonflict is even possible at all: it is a struggle for the interpretation of something that finally resists any interpretation, and thus opens the field of ideological warfare. And this is why theory may be of some assistanee in the ideologieal class struggle. In its enlightened moment, theory can "demystify" mystifications, and isolate the kernel of nonsense they eontain. In its materialist moment, it analyzes the logic of mystifieation, and opens the breach of intervention: an intervention earried out through the alleys of signifiers, resisting the temptation to reduee the phantasy, but confronting it and, with some luck, getting 132 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL uneonseious trajeetory "phantasy -+ desire -+ identification," which is the mechanism of subjectivation, being the material "basis" ofthis proeess.
Being a cover that covers a hole in the whole, the phantasy is what is "the most real" in an ideology. The "test ofreality" for an ideology consists in its capacity to incorporate this obturator into a convineing (coherent, unifying) ideological fa~ade: therefore, many eonflicting ideologies may compete around the same phantasy -offering diverse elass-interested interpretations ofthis non-sensical marker ofthe class struggle. It is their incorporation of the phantasy that guarantees them the "appropriate" intermediary distance from "reality": ideologies do not situate themselves en face to social reality, they construe it around the absence of the social "real" (in the Lacanian sense), the class struggle, marked in their discourse by a stereotype, the phantasy. This is why ideologieal eonflict is even possible at all: it is a struggle for the interpretation of something that finally resists any interpretation, and thus opens the field of ideological warfare. And this is why theory may be of some assistanee in the ideologieal class struggle. In its enlightened moment, theory can "demystify" mystifications, and isolate the kernel of nonsense they eontain. In its materialist moment, it analyzes the logic of mystifieation, and opens the breach of intervention: an intervention earried out through the alleys of signifiers, resisting the temptation to reduee the phantasy, but confronting it and, with some luck, getting MOCN1KlFROM H1STOR1CAL MARXISMS TO H1STOR1CAL MATERIAL1SM over it -retracing the mechanisms of subjectivation and alleviating the burden ofhistory that is our common lot, the lot ofits "subjects. 3. For an elaboration ofthe "productive force" ofillusions, especially in connection with the formation ofnationallanguages, the aesthetic problem ofliterary production, etc., see R. Mocnik, "Towards a Materialist Concept of Literature," Cultural Critique, no. 4 (Fall 1986).
4. The list of failures is impressive: Plekhanov's "psychology of the socidl individual," situated somewhere between the social base and the superstructure (an echo of Plekhanov's desperate attempt may be detected in Levi-Strauss' localization ofthe sphere ofmythology in La Pensee sauvage); Lukacs "imputed consciousness"; a variety ofpsychologizations from Reich to Fromm to Marcuse; the philosophy of"praxis." Even Gramsci's "civil society" may be added to the list, especiaIly in view of its recent re-elaborations.
(And, while the political importance of these latter is undeniable, it was precisely the theoretical impotence of"Eastern Marxism" that necessitated the re-introduction of a relatively disinvested traditional notion in order to interpret new political phenomena with old theoretical tools.)
5. Habermas' notion of the Lebenswelt (or "lifeworld") is, in effect, an escapehatch to help hirn out ofthe impasses ofhis hyper-rationalist conception of communication. 1t is therefore hereditarily marked by this initial bias: 1. The background of communication that we conceptualize as a network of possible beliefs (beliefs that the communicating parties need not consider as necessary, and certainly not as true, but merely have to admit as possible to entertain), is supposed to be "a background knowledge" (Hintergrundwissen ). Such an "inteIlectualist" position either presupposes a very loose conception of knowledge (and thereby undermines its own enlightened foundation) or it imposes too heavy a condition of possibility upon communication (and thereby deprives itself of any explanatory value). 2. The inner articulation of the Lebenswelt is overly rigid: the notion of lebensweltlichen Verweisungszusammenhangen (or "lifeworld referential contexts") is clearly a mystificatory hypostasis of the analytical "principle of charity," which, while it may weIl be "empiricist," is nevertheless quite operative and gives a much more adequate account of interpretive activity (i.e. since it operates locally and without universalistic pretension over it -retracing the mechanisms of subjectivation and alleviating the burden ofhistory that is our common lot, the lot ofits "subjects. 3. For an elaboration ofthe "productive force" ofillusions, especially in connection with the formation ofnationallanguages, the aesthetic problem ofliterary production, etc., see R. Mocnik, "Towards a Materialist Concept of Literature," Cultural Critique, no. 4 (Fall 1986).
5. Habermas' notion of the Lebenswelt (or "lifeworld") is, in effect, an escapehatch to help hirn out ofthe impasses ofhis hyper-rationalist conception of communication. 1t is therefore hereditarily marked by this initial bias: 1. The background of communication that we conceptualize as a network of possible beliefs (beliefs that the communicating parties need not consider as necessary, and certainly not as true, but merely have to admit as possible to entertain), is supposed to be "a background knowledge" (Hintergrundwissen ). Such an "inteIlectualist" position either presupposes a very loose conception of knowledge (and thereby undermines its own enlightened foundation) or it imposes too heavy a condition of possibility upon communication (and thereby deprives itself of any explanatory value). 2. The inner articulation of the Lebenswelt is overly rigid: the notion of lebensweltlichen Verweisungszusammenhangen (or "lifeworld referential contexts") is clearly a mystificatory hypostasis of the analytical "principle of charity," which, while it may weIl be "empiricist," is nevertheless quite operative and gives a much more adequate account of interpretive activity (i.e. since it operates locally and without universalistic pretension 8. The "subject supposed to believe" would playa similar role in the ideological process as the Lacanian "subject supposed to know" (on the model ofwhich it is forged) plays in the psychoanalytic process. We can illustrate this function with the example of the self-fulfilling character of collective delusions. If, in an appropriately unstable social situation, a rumour starts that "the oil (or sugar, etc.) is going to run out," it may be that this rumour is not true at the moment when it is launched (the stocks of oil being sufficient for normal consumption); but if people start acting upon this (originally "false") rumour, it may weIl become true. How do people act upon such a rumour? Suppose I am enlightened enough not to believe the rumour; I may even positively know it to be false. But non obstante my rationalism and/or my knowledge, I will reason in the following manner: "I know the rumour is false, but other people may believe it. Acting upon their (false) belief, they will rush to the store and pile up private stocks; and the oil is likely then to run out. So I better rush to the store myself and get some oil." Even under the supposition that everybody in the population reasons in this way, the implicit consensus as to the falsity of the prediction will not prevent its finally coming true; the general recognition that it is possible to believe the rumour, Le. the identification of every member of the population with the subject supposed to believe will do the trick. 8. The "subject supposed to believe" would playa similar role in the ideological process as the Lacanian "subject supposed to know" (on the model ofwhich it is forged) plays in the psychoanalytic process. We can illustrate this function with the example of the self-fulfilling character of collective delusions. If, in an appropriately unstable social situation, a rumour starts that "the oil (or sugar, etc.) is going to run out," it may be that this rumour is not true at the moment when it is launched (the stocks of oil being sufficient for normal consumption); but if people start acting upon this (originally "false") rumour, it may weIl become true. How do people act upon such a rumour? Suppose I am enlightened enough not to believe the rumour; I may even positively know it to be false. But non obstante my rationalism and/or my knowledge, I will reason in the following manner: "I know the rumour is false, but other people may believe it. Acting upon their (false) belief, they will rush to the store and pile up private stocks; and the oil is likely then to run out. So I better rush to the store myself and get some oil." Even under the supposition that everybody in the population reasons in this way, the implicit consensus as to the falsity of the prediction will not prevent its finally coming true; the general recognition that it is possible to believe the rumour, Le. the identification of every member of the population with the subject supposed to believe will do the trick.
9. The classic description of this mechanism is given by Freud in "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse". The elegance ofFreud's solution -that the identificational link binding together members of "die Masse" is nothing other than their common identification with the Leader -is connected to the exemplificatory, and therefore to a certain extent exceptional, nature of bis "case." The Waldheim-case has the same purity. But the majority of ideological phenomena are more complicated and demand arieher conceptual apparatus, as we will see in amoment.
10. In Gricean terms, the assumption ofthis "point ofview" as to (5) would follow from a direct application of the "maxim of quantity," a simple principle of everyday conversation.
11. That is, if we take it as a "commisive"; if taken as a simple constative, as John Rosenthai reminds me, a third possible interpretation would follow from the principle of interpretation that can be formulated, e.g., "L.B.J. knows he is going to lose the war, but he draws some solace from the fact that other D.S. presidents have already lost wars in the past." The background ideology would, in this case, be something like "the stateman's wisdom"; and the relevant "phantasy," some adequate topos from the stoicist tradition. Cicero somewhere suggests the appropriate strategy to manipulate this kind of topoi referring to the "great ancestors' tradition": "if you can find an analogy in the past for what you want to propose, teH your audience to foHow the great ancestors' example; ifyou can't find such an analogy, exhort them to do something nobody has ever dared before." -A further elaboration of the concept of "phantasy," proposed infra in this essay, could reformulate the Aristotelian doctrine of endoxa (generally accepted beliefs that serve as "premisses" to rhetorical enthymemes), verifying their compulsiveness as weH as their inconclusiveness (opposite "conclusions" can be drawn from the same endoxon), and situating them within the context of a materialist theory of the "trans-subjective," "pseudo-objective" status of ideology.
12. Belief is the privileged (and maybe the only) self-fulfilling modality of desire: any form of renunciation is supported by the belief that it gives someone else pleasure -and is gratified by this mere supposition. The libidinal economy of belief makes "the subject supposed to enjoy" a necessary complement to "the subject supposed to believe." (On the mechanisms of renunciation and the complementary supposed pleasure, cf. A Grosrichard, La Structure du serail [Paris: Seuil, 1979]).
13. Here is arecent example, coming -significantly -from an historian who takes ideology seriously: "Ideology, as we know, is not arefleetion of reality, but a way to act upon it. For this action to have at least some effect, there should not be too large a gap between the illusionary representation and the 'reality' of life" (from G. Duby, L'imaginaire du feodalisme [Paris: GaHimard, 1978] ). Ideology is thus placed both outside social reality (as an instrument to act upon it) and inside that reality (its importance for an bistorian deriving from its status as a social fact among others). The solution of situating ideology at an intermediate distance -not too close, not too far -from reality, is symptomatic for its utopian indeterminacy.
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MOCNIKIFROM HISTORICAL MARXISMS TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 9. The classic description of this mechanism is given by Freud in "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse". The elegance ofFreud's solution -that the identificational link binding together members of "die Masse" is nothing other than their common identification with the Leader -is connected to the exemplificatory, and therefore to a certain extent exceptional, nature of bis "case." The Waldheim-case has the same purity. But the majority of ideological phenomena are more complicated and demand arieher conceptual apparatus, as we will see in amoment.
14. "The thing that distinguishes and at the same time reveals this part ofthe dream-work is its purpose. This function behaves in the manner which the poet maliciously ascribes to philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the dreamstructure with shreds and patches [Heine, "Die Heimkehr"]. As a result of its efforts, the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible experience. Even if one were to separate it, this would not involve any alteration in our conception. We should then have to say: dreams in the analytic sense comprise the dream-work proper together with the secondary revision of its products" (SE, vol. XII, pp. 274-275). In his article on "Psycho-Analysis," contributed to Marcuse's Handwörterbuch, Freud states that, "strictly speaking," secondary elaboration "does not form apart of the dream-work" (idem., p. 241). Freud's hesitation can be most clearly displayed by juxtaposing the following two passages: "Are we to suppose that what happens is that in the first instance the dream constructing factors ... put together a provisional dream-content out of the material provided, and that this content is subsequently re-cast so as to conform so far as possible to the demands of a second agency? This is scarcely probable. We must assurne rather that from the very first the demands of this second factor constitute one of the conditions which the dream must satisfy and that this condition ... operates simultaneously in a conductive and selective sense upon the mass of material present in the dream-thoughts" (SE, vol. V, p. 499). "I shall not deal exhaustively with this part ofthe dream-work, and will therefore merely remark that the easiest way of forming an idea of its nature is to suppose -though the supposition probably does not meet the factsthat it only comes into operation AFTER the dream-content has already been constructed" (Idem., p. 666). 
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